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I. INTRODUCTION

In this Symposium, we were asked to identify and articulate the
nature of our passion for teaching corporate law. My passion-a bit
odd in this context, perhaps-is bankruptcy. In addition to teaching
the basic Corporations course, I also teach Corporate Reorganization
and Bankruptcy, and my research has focused primarily on
corporate reorganization issues. As I say, my particular passion
may seem out of place in the context of this Symposium. The
corporation is an engine for maximizing wealth. Yet we bankruptcy
types obsess about financial ruin. We pray for the next recession.
We sell short. Our chips sit on the "Don't Pass Line."
Given these proclivities of mine, it should not surprise that when
I teach limited liability and veil-piercing, I see debtor-creditor law
in the background. After all, they say when you have a hammer,
everything looks like a nail. Veil-piercing fights arise only in the
context of corporate financial distress, a fact that distinguishes veilpiercing from the bulk of corporate law. Most of corporate law
focuses on relations among managers and shareholders, and
disputes arise in times of corporate health as well as in times of
distress. By contrast, limited liability and veil-piercing involve
relations between the corporation and its participants, on the one
hand, and creditors on the other, with corporate financial distress
as the backdrop for disputes. On occasion, the party challenging the
corporation's limited liability is a bankruptcy trustee.' You can
perhaps sense my glee when we arrive at this part of the syllabus.

* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. A.B. 1983, Cornell
University; J.D. 1987, Harvard University. E-mail: tungfiusfca.edu; web: <www.usfca.edu/
law/tung>.
' See, e.g., Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 127 N.E.2d 832, 833 (1955) (reporting veilpiercing suit by trustee of bankrupt subsidiary against parent corporation).
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The relation between veil-piercing and debtor-creditor law is not
intuitively obvious to students. Limited liability is a fundamental
corporate characteristic, traditionally presented as one of four
defining features of corporations-along with separate and perpetual existence, centralized management, and free transferability of
interests.' Consistent with this defining aspect of limited liability,
veil-piercing and other limited liability issues typically appear fairly
early in the casebooks. 3 The scope and limits of limited liability are
among the first things students learn about corporations. This is
"bread-and-butter" corporate law.
In my teaching approach, I show that veil-piercing belongs not
only to the domain of corporate law but also to the realm of debtorcreditor law. I use concepts of risk to show the relation between
veil-piercing and other debtor-creditor rules. Limited liability rules
affect the structuring of relations-that is, allocations of
risk-between corporate debtors and their creditors. As such, these
rules are a species of debtor-creditor law. I use the law of fraudulent transfer to illustrate this kinship between veil-piercing and
traditional debtor-creditor rules.4 Related to this risk-based
approach is the idea that-perhaps counter to the initial intuitions
of most students-debtors as well as creditors benefit from rules
limiting borrowers' expost ability to shift risks to creditors. Credit
markets adjust to legal rules. Reduced risk to creditors translates
into lower borrowing costs overall. This approach to teaching
limited liability and veil-piercing serves as a useful vehicle for
introducing not only theoretical questions but also basic financial
concepts with which law students are typically unfamiliar.
This Essay is organized as follows. In Part II, I describe the riskshifting function of limited liability and my teaching approach. Part
III begins the discussion of limits to risk shifting. It introduces veil2 See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATIONS 74 (7th ed. 1995) (describing corporation's defining features); LEWIS D.
SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS, LAW AND POLICY, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 1 (3d ed. 1994)
(describing same); LEWIS D. SOLOMON & ALAN R. PALMITER, CORPORATIONS, EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 3 (2d ed. 1994) (describing same).
3 CARY & EISENBERG, supranote 2, at 111; SOLOMON ET AL., supra note 2, at 328.

4 This idea originated with Dean Robert Clark's foundational work on corporate debtors.
See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the CorporateDebtor to Its Creditors,90 HARV. L.
REV. 505 (1977) (noting relation between veil-piercing and debtor-creditor rules).
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piercing and describes why veil-piercing is consistent with a
hypothetical contract rationale for limited liability. In Part IV, I
introduce the law of fraudulent transfer. I show its kinship with
veil-piercing rules and compare and contrast the two. Throughout
the Essay, I include questions I pose in class in order to drive class
discussion. Also for purposes of discussion, I focus primarily on the
closely held corporation, the context in which most veil-piercing
issues arise.5
II. LIMITED LIABILITY AND EFFICIENT
RISK SHFTING TO CREDITORS
Because veil-piercing cases arise only in the context of financial
distress, students tend to view limited liability rules from an expost
perspective. They focus only on the parties to particular disputes.
From that perspective, limited liability appears to be a device that
encourages business activity by forcing creditors to subsidize it. To
wit, creditors are left with the losses when a corporation fails. A
successful veil-piercing action is then simply judicial intervention to
remedy abusive situations. Limited liability is pro-corporation; veilpiercing is pro-creditor.
Happily though, not all corporations fail. While veil-piercing is
the single most litigated area of corporate law,' the litigated
outcomes capture only after-the-fact loss allocation and damage
control. Court decisions do not provide a complete picture of limited
liability's effects on the behavior of creditors and their corporate

' Successful veil-piercing actions almost always involve either close corporations-in
which a relative handful of shareholders also run the business, serving as corporate officers
and directors-or corporate groups. See Robert B. Thompson, Piercingthe Corporate Veil:
An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1036 (1991) [hereinafter Thompson, Empirical
Study] (providing empirical analysis of factors courts consider in veil-piercing cases). For
simplicity of exposition, I assume a complete overlap between shareholders and managers.
There are no passive investors. I therefore refer to these beneficiaries of limited liability as
"insiders." As a practical matter, passive investors seem not to be at great risk of personal
liability from veil-piercing. Id. at 1056. For a discussion of the effect on limited liability of
"unpacking' these various functions, see Robert B. Thompson, UnpackingLimited Liability:
Direct and Vicarious Liability of CorporateParticipantsfor Torts of the Enterprise,47VAND.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1994) [hereinafter Thompson, UnpackingLimited Liability] (noting that reach
of limited liability differs as among shareholders, officers, and directors).
6 Thompson, Empirical Study, supranote 5.
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borrowers. I try to get students thinking about the ex ante effects
of limited liability rules. I suggest that veil-piercing doctrine may
be something more than simply a collection of ex post judicial
attempts to balance the competing interests of corporate creditors
and corporate insiders. I suggest that limited liability and veilpiercing rules form a unified whole, a sensible mechanism to govern
relations between corporate debtors and their creditors.
The fundamental theme is that credit markets react to legal
rules. Limited liability shifts risk to creditors, but creditors can
respond ex ante. We discuss the perspective of creditors generally,
not just those caught in litigation over the limits of limited liability.
We consider ex ante effects of the rules on creditor behavior and on
7
corporate borrowing costs.

In this Part, I focus on limited liability and why it might make
sense. I introduce some fundamental concepts: (i) the relation
between risk and return; (ii) the idea that some parties may be
superior to others at bearing risk; and (iii) that it makes sense to set
default rules to minimize transaction costs. I begin the discussion
with financial creditors. I then address other, less sophisticated
creditors and involuntary creditors. In the next Part, I take up veilpiercing, showing that it places a sensible limit on limited liability.
A. RISK, RETURN, AND RISK BEARING

Many students probably have not given much thought to how
banks and other lenders set interest rates. They need a little
prodding to understand risk and return. They see simply that
limited liability forces creditors to take losses to subsidize corporate
insiders' business risk-taking. This prompts my question: why do
creditors ever lend to corporations, knowing they will not get their
money back if the corporation fails? Why not simply buy government bonds-that is, lend to a riskless borrower? Or why not lend
only to individuals doing business with unlimited liability? The

' The question of ex ante effects of debtor-creditor rules is a major theoretical question
being debated among bankruptcy scholars. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy's Uncontested
Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573 (1999) (describing competing sets of axioms at work in corporate
reorganization scholarship).
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answer, of course, is that risky loans reap higher rates of interest.'
Creditors will lend into risky situations, but not for free. They will
demand a return commensurate with the risk undertaken.9 The
interest rate is simply the cost of renting money, and for a higher
risk of default, the creditor will demand higher rent to reflect the
possibility of loss.1"
With this risk-return idea in mind, I turn next to the corporate
insiders' perspective. If the bank charges a premium to corporate
borrowers in response to limited liability, why do insiders willingly
pay this higher rate-indirectly through the corporate borrower-in
exchange for their limited liability? Presumably, the firm could
obtain a lower interest rate were it not incorporated, and insiders
assumed unlimited liability.
Well, insiders generally do not relish the thought of losing
everything. While they may generally be optimistic about their
business prospects," they would rather not put their entire personal
wealth at the risk of the business. They would rather incorporate
and have the corporation pay the higher interest rate in return for
peace of mind. From this perspective, limited liability is a sort of
personal insurance policy for insiders against the failure of the
business. And the incremental increase in the interest rate is
simply the premium for this insurance.
Over and above insiders' financial investment in the firm, then,
the bank is paid to take the risk of the corporation's failure. Why is
the bank willing to take this risk, even for the higher interest? If
the firm fails, insiders keep their personal wealth, but the bank may

" Moreover, even for individuals operating under "unlimited" liability, their liability is
limited to the amount of their wealth. No liability is truly unlimited. See generally Steven
Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (considering
judgment-proof individuals as well as firms).
" See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 153 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing risk-return relationship).
'0I make an analogy to a car rental. If a rent-a-car company thought there were some
non.trivial probability that a particular customer would not return her rented car,
presumably that customer would be charged a higher rental rate to account for this risk.
" See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (andCause Other SocialHarms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101 (1997) (describing individual and institutional causes of excessive optimism and
overconfidence among corporate managers).
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lose the full amount of its loan. 2 The corporation's owner-managers
are insured against failure. Can the lender insure as well?
The bank does have protection against the firm's failure that
functions something like insurance. First of all, the lender enjoys
the same limited liability that insiders do, insofar as the lender's
loss is limited to the amount of its investment in the business. Its
loss is therefore capped. Second, banks make many loans. A
particular loan may fail, but presumably, not all will. Banks know
that there will be defaults in their loan portfolios. But if they have
done their credit analysis right, the good loans will far outnumber
the bad, and returns on the good loans will exceed the losses on the
bad.
So with respect to a given corporate borrower, a financial creditor
does have a type of insurance against the borrower's default. It is
not a policy purchased from an insurance company, but a type of
insurance it creates for itself. It is called diversification.13 A
creditor protects itself from the possibility of borrower default and
the risks imposed by limited liability by diversifying its risk. It
may, for example, allocate its loans across different industries or
different regions, so that an industry-wide or region-wide downturn
will not break the bank.
By contrast, corporate insiders--especially founders of businesses-may be poorly diversified. The insider makes specific,
nontransferable investments of human and financial capital in her
business, and, if it fails, these investments are typically difficult to
recover. 4 In general, the financial creditor is likely to be better able
to bear the risk of loss of its entire investment than are corporate
insiders. Because the creditor is diversified and the insider is not,
the latter may be more risk averse, while the former is the superior

12 For purposes of this discussion, I ignore the effects ofthe bank's institutional structure
on its taste for risk. The discussion applies as readily if the financial creditor were an
individual.
"3See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 9, at 165 (explaining that diversification reduces
variability in stock portfolio, thereby reducing risk).
"' See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, LimitedLiability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 107 (1985) (noting difficulty in diversifying human capital).

20001

LIMITED LIABILITY

553

risk bearer.15 Corporate insiders would therefore generally prefer
limited liability at the cost of a higher interest rate.
B. DEFAULT RULES AND TRANSACTION COSTS

There may be cases where limited liability turns out not to be the
preferred rule for the parties. For instance, creditors may fear
moral hazard from insiders' limited liability. Insured against the
loss of their personal wealth, insiders in some cases may have too
little incentive to be prudent in their corporate decisionmaking. 6 In
those cases, limited liability would deter lenders from lending. Even
if a loan is forthcoming, the rate of interest demanded might simply
be too high for the likes of the corporate borrower and its insiders.
What then?
Borrowers and lenders can contract around the limited liability
rule. Insiders of small firms are not infrequently asked to place
their personal wealth at risk along with the corporation's assets.
Banks often demand personal guarantees from small business
owners using the corporate form.' 7 Borrowers and lenders, then, are
not simply stuck with the rule of limited liability, but can contract
for a different risk distribution.
Given that limited liability is only a default, could the presumption as easily be set the other way? Why not simply let the parties

5 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited ShareholderLiability
for CorporateTorts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1919 (1991) ('In small closely-held firms, the firm's
creditors may often be more efficient risk-bearers than the firm's individual owners.");
Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons For CorporateLaw, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 433, 450 (1995) (discussing comparative risk bearing ability of small-firm creditor
versus equityholder); see also David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and
Creditors,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1565, 1630 (1991) (suggesting that even tort creditors may be
superior risk bearers compared to close corporation insiders).
1" See Easterbrook &Fischel, supranote 14, at 110 (discussing moral hazard from limited
liability in close corporation context); Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited
Liability in CorporationLaw, 30 U. TORONTOL.J. 117,141 (1980) (noting severe moral hazard
problem in small, tightly held companies).
" This is con3istent with some commentators' view that limited liability may be
inefficient for closely held corporations. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 110
(noting that investor diversification and reduction in monitoring costs-advantages of limited
liability for public companies-do not apply for close corporations); Halpern et al., supranote
16, at 148 (suggesting that unlimited liability is optimal rule for small closely held
companies).
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contract explicitly for limited liability if they wish, but leave general
liability rules otherwise undisturbed? More generally, how do we
choose between opposing default rules? How should default rules be
set?
Assuming there are costs to explicit contracting, then one
plausible basis for setting the default is to mimic the arrangement
that most parties would generally make if bargaining were costless.
To the extent that contracting costs inhibit real bargaining, a
"majoritarian" default gives most parties what they would agree
to
most of the time for the least cost. A different default would be
inefficient, forcing parties to either expend resources contracting for
the desired outcome, live with a suboptimal arrangement, or not
transact at all. A majoritarian default, by minimizing transaction
costs, therefore facilitates more desirable transactions on the most
18
desirable terms for the parties.
Assuming, then, that most creditors and corporate borrowers
prefer limited liability,1 9 that should be the default rule. Explicit
contracting for limited liability may be cumbersome and expensive.
To duplicate limited liability by contract, insiders would need to
obtain releases from all corporate creditors. Transaction costs
would likely be greater than if we simply set limited liability as the
default rule.2" Economizing on transaction costs facilitates corporate debt contracts and reduces the cost of credit.

Penalty default theory provides another rationale for setting default rules. In addition
to transaction costs, there may be other barriers to efficient contracting. For example, if the
withholding of private information by one party is the source of inefficiency, then it may be
preferable in those situations to set default rules exactly the opposite of what the parties
would have agreed to. This approach encourages the informed party to initiate negotiation
to contract around the rule, forcing disclosure of the information and more efficient
contracting. See generallyIan Ayres & Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing utility of different
default rules in different situations). For purposes of this discussion, I focus only on the
transaction cost issues.
" I say "assuming" since in the close corporation context, this assumption may be
problematic. Involuntary creditors also present problems. See infra 27-28 and accompany
text.
'o See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation,50 MD. L.
REV. 80, 105-06 (1991) (discussing costs of contracting for limited liability in close corporation
context, and suggesting that limited liability may be efficient bargain for close corporations).
This may be a closer question with close corporations than with public companies. See supra
note 17 and accompany text.
18
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This discussion raises another issue, however. To this point, the
discussion has focused on financial creditors. Because financial
creditors are typically well informed and well diversified, a hypothetical bargain approach seems to make sense. The analysis may
be more problematic, however, as we consider other types of
creditors.
C. REFINING THE CONTRACTARIAN RATIONALE FOR RISK SHIFTING

Some voluntary creditors have fewer self-protection mechanisms
at their disposal than financial creditors. Lower-level employees
and small suppliers, for example, may lack the expertise to perform
credit analysis in the way financial creditors do. Their ability to
assess and "adjust" to credit risk may therefore not compare to that
of the financial creditor.2 ' Small suppliers will typically lack the
resources necessary to evaluate individual firm risk.2 On the other
hand, diversification and sufficient knowledge of its general
industry might enable a supplier to charge prices that reflect its
customers' default risk on average.2 Employees also may not be
diversified.24 Depending on the particular employee's position, she

2 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 885 (1996) (describing small voluntary
creditor's incentives to remain rationally uninformed about firm's capital structure);
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 113 (describing small creditor's disincentive to
investigate debtor'.s capital). To the extent they can and do adjust to the credit risk of the
corporation, employees do not charge explicit interest. Instead, they charge interest implicitly
in the pricing of their services supplied to the corporation. Some suppliers take this approach
as well.
' See John Hudson, The Case Against Secured Lending, 15 INT'LREV. L. &EcoN. 47,56
(1995) (describing bank's superior ability to determine its financial position and monitor firm
as compared to trade creditors); Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "Onthe Natureof Bankruptcy"
Bankruptcy, Priority,and Economics, 75 VA. L. REV. 219, 225 (1989) (noting trade creditors'
typical lack of financial sophistication). Suppliers tend to charge uniform interest rates to all
their customers buying on credit, which suggests that they do not tailor their pricing to
account for individual firm default risk. See Douglas G. Baird, Security InterestsReconsidered,80 VA. L. REV. 2249, 2259 (1994) (noting that trade creditors do not customize terms for
individual customers, but rather for industry as a whole); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured
Creditor'sBargain,80 VA. L. REv. 1887, 1936 (1994) (noting that even sophisticated trade
creditors do not charge interest rates that "anticipate [a] debtor's grant of security").
2
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 21, at 886.
24 The degree of an employee's diversification must include consideration of her
alternative opportunities in the market. Halpern et al., supra note 16, at 143.
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also may not have the expertise or access to information necessary
to gauge her employer's financial health and price her services
appropriately." She may be no better-and may be worse-at
bearing the risk of corporate failure than corporate insiders.
Therefore, it may be that the hypothetical contract she would strike
with her employer would not include limited liability.2 6
What about involuntary creditors, 7 who cannot contract with the
firm? For example, tort victims cannot be identified ex ante. They
do not negotiate with-or even choose-their "borrowers." They do
not engage in "credit analysis." They do not set interest rates to
reflect risk or otherwise engage in ex ante risk allocation. For tort
creditors, the hypothetical bargain approach is the most problematic. Unlike financial creditors, tort creditors cannot adjust ex ante
to the risk of corporate failure. Limited liability therefore enables
firms to externalize some of their tort costs-that is, shift them to
tort victims. Firms will therefore under-invest in safety and engage
in excessively risky projects.2 " And tort victims are left uncom

The existence of a union may alleviate this problem somewhat.
See Halpern et al., supra note 16, at 149 (proposing general exception to limited
liability for employee claims). On the other hand, other arrangements like unemployment
benefits may indirectly compensate employees for this financial risk.
27 The line between voluntary and involuntary creditors is not a bright one, of course.
It may be more accurate to arrange creditors along a spectrum of voluntariness. See Bebchuk
& Fried, supra note 21, at 864 (describing inability of many creditors, even some voluntary
creditors, to adjust terms of their credit to account for distributional consequences of secured
credit); LoPucki, supra note 22, at 1896 n.38 (describing "reluctant" creditors, existence of
which blurs line between voluntary and involuntary creditors).
' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 107 ("Where high transaction costs prohibit
those affected by risky activities from charging an appropriate risk premium ....
the
probability that firms with limited liability will undertake projects with an inefficiently high
level of risk increases."); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1882-83.
Some commentators have asserted that no significant barriers exist to prevent optimal
contracting between consumers and manufacturers in product markets. These commentators
maintain that consumers possess sufficient information to assess product risk, so that the
content of product warranties should be determined by markets-and not by courts or
regulators. See generally Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The
Revived Casefor EnterpriseLiability, 91 MICH. L.REv. 683,713 (1993) (discussing debate over
traditional assumptions underpinning strict liability). Adoption of this view might
presumably also hold that consumer choice concerning manufacturers' limited liability should
also be respected, and therefore that a hypothetical bargain rationale for limited liability also
applies to products liability claimants, who voluntarily purchased corporate manufacturers'
products. Put differently, the manufacturer's creditworthiness is viewed simply as one
component of its warranty.
This discussion takes us a bit afield from the scope of what might plausibly be covered
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pensated for the risks they bear. There may be other justifications
for limited liability as to involuntary creditors, but the majoritarian
default analysis does not apply neatly to them.
Limited liability might still be the optimal rule. Overall, the
benefits of limited liability-for example, facilitating public
securities markets and investor diversification-may outweigh its
costs, including the costs of externalized tort risk.29 But this issue
is hotly contested. 0 In any event, this rationale is a bit different
from the hypothetical contract analysis with which we began the
discussion.
Having simply highlighted the complexities of a hypothetical
contract approach for different types of creditors, I do not attempt
to resolve them here or in class discussion. For the balance of the
discussion, we will rely on financial creditors as our paradigmatic
voluntary creditors and continue with our hypothetical bargain
approach.

in a class discussion on limited liability, and so for present purposes, I assent to the
traditional view that consumers and other potential tort victims are not in a position to make
informed choices on these issues.
" In addition, while limited liability enables externalization ofrisk to tort creditors, other
arrangements may also exist to minimize this effect. To the extent that a corporation has
financial creditors, who typically impose financial and other restraints on the borrower and
monitor compliance, other creditors enjoy something of a free ride. Thompson, Unpacking
Limited Liability, supra note 5, at 37. Financial creditors will have some incentive, for
example, to monitor the debtor's potentially hazardous activities. Therefore, while other
creditors may not have the same facility at tailoring credit terms to a given borrower's risk
profile, they are also not entirely at sea. In addition, managers with firm-specific investments
of human capital at stake will have some incentive to insure. The insurer provides both a
source of payment to tort victims and a monitor of the firm's risky projects. See Easterbrook
& Fischel, supra note 14, at 104-07 (describing managers' incentives to insure and insurer's
role as contract creditor).
' Compare Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 15, at 1907 (advocating pro rata
shareholder liability for tort obligations); Leebron, supra note 15 (questioning limited liability
for tort obligations and suggesting pro rata shareholder liability may be more efficient) with
Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability, supranote 5, at 37 (arguing that because nonlegal
constraints reduce externalization to involuntary creditors, limited liability should apply).
See also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 78 (1994) (suggesting insurance and tort
creditor priority in bankruptcy as superior alternatives to veil piercing in favor of tort
creditors).
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D. SUMMARY

We have introduced students to an ex ante perspective-the idea
that credit markets react to legal rules ex ante. Pointing out the
relation between risk and return explains that voluntary creditors
respond to higher risk by demanding a commensurate return in the
form of a steeper interest rate. In addition, because voluntary
creditors are generally better at bearing the risk of a given corporation's failure than are its insiders, limited liability is the right
default rule. Voluntary creditors are typically diversified; corporate
insiders typically are not.
On the other hand, we also note that debtors and creditors can
and often do contract around limited liability. Contract creditors,
corporations and insiders can tailor arrangements to suit their
particular needs. A creditor may bargain for a personal guaranty or
an appropriately high interest rate to reflect the risk of the creditor's investment.
In addition, we have used limited liability as a vehicle for
introducing the traditional justification for how default rules should
be set. The idea of a majoritarian default-that default rules should
reflect the bargain that most parties would strike-is a powerful
one, and it is good for students to begin to think about legal rules in
this way. A majoritarian default rule saves transaction costs-and
therefore more desirable transactions are facilitated-if the law
provides a standard form that most parties would adopt. We also
point out limits to this hypothetical contract approach with respect
to involuntary creditors.
III. LIMITS OF RISK SHIFTING: VEIL-PIERCING

Having outlined the hypothetical contract rationale for limited
liability, we consider the related topic of veil-piercing, which limits
the risk shifting to creditors that may be accomplished through
limited liability. Should there be limits to insiders' ability to shift
risk to creditors? If so, what should those limits be?
Once credit has been extended, the corporation's owner-shareholders will have incentive to engage in activities riskier than the
creditor would prefer. That is because the shareholders enjoy
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unlimited upside if a risky project succeeds, but their downside-thanks to limited liability-is limited to the amount they have
invested in the firm. Creditor returns, on the other hand, are fixed.
They do not share in any upside beyond their agreed interest and
repayment of principal. Shareholders enjoy the rest. On the
downside, the creditor stands to lose its entire investment in the
firm if corporate assets turn out to be insufficient to make repayment.
When the downside comes to pass, what circumstances, if any,
might justify ex post exceptions to limited liability? Piercing the
corporate veil allows a creditor to reach insiders' personal assets in
satisfaction of a corporate debt, in effect granting an exception to
insiders' limited liability for the benefit of the creditor. As with the
discussion of limited liability, we consider not only after-the-fact loss
distributing effects of veil-piercing, but also its ex ante effects on the
structuring of corporate debt transactions.
Why ever pierce the veil for contract creditors? Does not the
creditor assume the risk of not getting paid? Has that creditor not
bargained for whatever package of protections it holds and whatever
risks are left to it? This inquiry forces us to think about different
types of risk and to distinguish among them. The contract creditor
can be said to have assumed some risk of business failure. Financial creditors have well-developed tools for this sort of credit
analysis. Veil-piercing, however, requires something more than
simple business failure. It typically requires something approaching
fraud. 3
The legal rules could be set in a way that initially places fraud
risk on creditors and allows them to contract around that risk if
they desire. How would that default rule affect the costs of credit?
It would raise costs for everyone.
Fraud risk is a difficult risk for creditors to analyze. Most
creditors would insist on contracting around that default rule.3 2 In

" See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 112 (describing fraud basis for veil
piercing); Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability, supra note 5, at 9 C'Courts generally
refuse to impose liability on shareholders unless they have control of the corporation and
there has been some misuse of the corporate form, such as fraud, undercapitalization, or
intermingling of corporate and individual transactions.").
' Any that did not would insist on higher returns overall to compensate for fraud risk.
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addition, forcing the parties expressly to contract for a fraud
exception to limited liability may be costly. How would such a
provision be drafted?
The vagueness of veil-piercing
doctrine-which frustrates students and commentators alike 3 -- may
give us some notion of the difficulty of specifying ex ante what sort
of behavior is undesirable. 4 Such a contract provision might also be
costly to monitor. Moreover, the contractual solution creates only
a breach of contract claim, which requires a specific showing of
damages by an aggrieved creditor. Not only is this costly, but it also
lacks the deterrent effect of veil-piercing. Assuming, in the creditor's best case, that both the corporation and its insiders contractually commit not to engage in specified acts of fraud or quasi-fraud,
the insider has only actual damages to lose if caught breaching its
promise.3 5 By contrast, a successful veil-piercing action exposes the
entirety of the insider's personal wealth to the aggrieved creditor's
claim.
What sort of deal would we imagine that borrowers and lenders
might want ex ante? Would borrowers and lenders in general agree,
for instance, that "siphoning' behavior should not be shielded by
limited liability?3 6 They probably would. It is be better for everyone
ex ante to have a rule of veil-piercing, which penalizes an insider for
inequitable conduct toward creditors. This rule enables corporate
borrowers to credibly commit not to defraud creditors, thereby
lowering risk to lenders, as well as lowering contracting and
monitoring costs. Therefore, veil-piercing rules will lower the costs

3 See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS 8 (1983) (decrying veil-piercing

decisions as jurisprudence by epithet).
See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
If only the corporation were bound to the anti-fraud proscriptions, that commitment
would likely be worthless to the creditor. The corporation's breach would most likely occur
in the context of financial distress, leaving the creditor with only a breach of contract claim
against a judgment-proof company.
Setting the default rule in this way would also forego whatever positive normgenerating effect the legal rule may have. That is, specifying penalties for fraud enforces a
norm against fraud, whereas a rule that requires creditors explicitly to contract for the
borrower's commitment to refrain from fraud may suggest that no anti-fraud norm exists but
is instead merely a matter for private ordering. Cass R. Sunstein, On the ExpressiveFunction
of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
' See DeWitt Truck Brokers v. W. Ray FlemmingFruitCo., 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976),
discussed infra Part IV.C.1.
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of credit for borrowers generally. Moreover, if we return to our
insurance analogy,3 7 limited liability to commit fraud is probably
more insurance than most insiders would willingly pay for ex ante.
The insurance premium would likely be steep, such that most
insiders would opt out of that coverage.
Without the veil-piercing rule-as well as the possibility of
additional sanctions for civil and criminal fraud-a "lemons"
problem might arise in the credit markets.3" If creditors cannot
discern honest corporate borrowers from those who might fleece
them, creditors must charge an average price for credit that
incorporates the possibility of bad borrowers. But honest borrowers,
unwilling to pay this higher average price, will be driven from the
market, leaving only the bad corporate borrowers. The market then
implodes, since creditors will be unwilling to lend into a market of
bad corporate borrowers whose insiders are protected by limited

liability.
Veil-piercing, then, is consistent with the goal of maximizing the
mutual interests of creditors and their corporate borrowers. Veilpiercing rules, like limited liability in general, are a sensible part of
the standard form contract between corporate borrowers and their
creditors. Limits to limited liability make sense.
IV. LIMITS OF RISK SHIFTING: FRAUDULENT TRANSFER
To this point, the discussion has fallen squarely within the
domain of corporate law. Veil-piercing and limited liability are
fundamental elements of the basic Corporations course. I next
introduce the law of fraudulent transfer. I compare and contrast it
with veil-piercing rules. I draw parallels between the two, showing
their kinship as rules governing debtor-creditor relations. Both
effectively limit debtor risk shifting to creditors. As with veilpiercing, fraudulent transfer law constrains debtor behavior expost,
but its existence benefits both debtors and creditors ex ante.39

37

See supratext accompanying note 11.

George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970).
" As with the preceding discussion, I focus primarily on the close corporation context.
See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
'

Mechanism, 84
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A. THE DOCTRINE

I start with a thumbnail sketch of the doctrine. Fraudulent
transfer law has two components. One addresses actual fraud. The
other addresses constructive fraud.
1. Actual Fraud. Fraudulent transfer law responds to a classic
human instinct-the instinct for financial survival. When the
debtor is hopelessly mired in debt and has defaulted on multiple
obligations, the creditors close in, intent on seizing the debtor's
assets in satisfaction of their debts. In the face of this pursuit, the
debtor may respond with evasion. She has no interest in being a
sitting duck. Despite her debt obligations, she is reluctant to part
with her assets. She will not wish to leave them readily available
for creditor seizure. Instead, she squirrels them away. She hides
them.
Or she may strategically transfer her assets. She may give them
to friends, with the understanding that she will retrieve them later
when the coast is clear. She may give them to relatives for safekeeping. These transfers are problematic, however, because they
work an intentional fraud on creditors. A transfer that is intended
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors in their collection efforts is
avoidable as a fraudulent transfer.4" The Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act (UFTA) enables creditors to set aside such transfers.
A creditor may ignore the fraudulent transfer and pursue the
debtor's transferred asset in the hands of the transferee, as though
no transfer had occurred. 4 ' The UFTA provides a helpful list of
"badges of fraud," which serve as useful indicia for determining
the debtor-transferor acted with the requisite fraudulent
whether
42
intent.
2. ConstructiveFraud.The fraudulent transfer rules also catch
constructively fraudulent transfers, for which no proof of bad intent
'o UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (1984) [hereinafter UFTA].
41

UFTA § 7.

42 Factors suggesting the requisite intent include the fact that the transfer was to an

insider, UFTA § 4(b)(1); that the transfer was concealed, id. § 4(b)(3); that before the transfer
was made the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit, id. § 4(b)(4); that the debtor was
insolvent after the transfer was made, id. § 4(b)(9); and that the transfer occurred shortly
after a substantial debt was incurred, id. § 4(b)(10). For the classic case applying the "badges
of fraud" analysis, see Twyne's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
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or evil motive is required. Instead, proof of constructive fraud
requires simply that the debtor transferred an asset (a) for less than
its reasonably equivalent value, (b) while the debtor was insolvent.43
Creditors can seize assets in the hands of the debtor's transferees if
and to the extent the debtor failed to obtain reasonably equivalent
value and was in financial distress at the time of the transfer. 4 In
essence, the debtor may not give away an asset if that transfer
impairs her ability to repay her debts.
B. MORAL AND CONTRACTARIAN UNDERPINNINGS

Historically, fraudulent transfer law carried moral overtones.
Developed under English common law and codified in The Statute
of Elizabeth in 1571," 5 it was partly a criminal law,46 while also
providing revenue for the Crown and a measure of protection for
creditors.47 Even constructive fraud, while requiring no explicit
proof of bad intent or evil motive, may simply be-at least in
part-a surrogate for actual fraud, providing a per se rule that is
less costly to prove than actual fraudulent intent.48
Besides the moral overtones, however, fraudulent transfer law
probably also reflects a majoritarian rule. Why? Would debtors and
creditors generally agree to it ex ante? Very probably. 9 Creditors
43 UFTA § 5(a). Constructive fraud is also available if the transaction is for less than
reasonably equivalent value and (a) leaves the debtor's business with unreasonably small
assets, id. § 4(a)(2)(i); or (b) if the debtor intends to or believes she will incur debts beyond her
ability to pay as they become due, id. § 4(a)(2)(ii).
"' See UFTA § 8 (describing available transferee defenses and offsets).
45 13 Eliz., ch. 5 (1571) (Eng.); see also 1 GARRARD GLENN,FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
AND PREFERENCES §§ 58-62 (rev. ed. 1940) (analyzing Statute of Elizabeth).
' See id. § 61b (describing imprisonment for fraudulent transfer).
47 One-half of the property transferred belonged to Crown. Id.
' Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 831 (1985); Barry L. Zaretsky, FraudulentTransferLaw as

the Arbiter of UnreasonableRisk, 46 S.C.L. REv. 1165, 1167 (1995).

" '"Fraudulent conveyance law ... should be viewed as a species of contract law,
representing one kind of control that creditors generally would want to impose and that
debtors would generally agree to accept." Baird & Jackson, supra note 48, at 836; see also
Clark, supra note 4, at 544 (noting reduced bargaining costs from default rule); Zaretsky,
supranote 48, at 1170 (noting same). Moreover, rules against fraudulent transfer may be
more than just defaults, insofar as there is no "opt-out" provision. The nature of the remedy
also suggests something more than a take-or-leave default provision. See infra notes 52-53
and accompanying text.
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would generally be unwilling to assume the risk of the debtor's
fraudulent transfers. Moreover, as in the veil-piercing context,
requiring explicit contracting against fraud would be expensive.
The range of debtor behavior intended to be proscribed would be
quite broad,5" and drafting proscriptions both detailed and complete
would be a formidable task. Instead, a state-supplied contract term
solves an incomplete contracting problem, protecting creditors from
particular types of risk-increasing transactions by debtors.
In addition, as with veil-piercing,51 fraudulent transfer law
provides the aggrieved creditor with more effective relief than the
simple contract damages remedy. The damages remedy is not
useful in the face of the breaching party's insolvency. Besides suing
the debtor-transferor, the creditor is entitled to pursue the asset in
the hands of the transferee.52 The creditor's right to the asset is in
effect protected by a species of property rule.53 The creditor is
entitled to undo the debtor's harmful act and not merely claim
damages against the debtor in financial distress. This property rule
protection enables a debtor to credibly and inexpensively commit ex
ante to refrain from certain transfers that impair its ability to repay
its debts.
By enabling this credible commitment, fraudulent transfer law,
like veil-piercing, protects debtors as well as creditors. It lowers
bargaining costs by supplying majoritarian terms. It lowers
monitoring costs with its property rule remedy. It lowers the costs
of credit overall, and without it, "[e]x ante the volume of loans would

'The range of potential debtor misconduct is virtually limitless." Zaretsky, supranote
48, at 1170.
51 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
52 See supranote 41 and accompanying text. Moreover, the first transferee is liable, even
despite her good faith, unless reasonably equivalent value was given. A subsequent
transferee may also be liable absent the giving of value in good faith. UFTA § 8.

' See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of PropertyRights, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 931, 950 (1985) (noting property-rule nature of fraudulent transfer law). In their
classic article, Calabresi and Melamed distinguish property rules-rules that strictly protect
rights by resort to injunctive relief-from liability rules, which only provide monetary
damages. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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be inefficiently low and interest rates inefficiently high to take
account of this possibility of hiding assets from creditors."5 4
C. WHY VEIL-PIERCING?
Veil-piercing and fraudulent transfer law, then, each provide
limits on borrower risk-shifting to creditors. Both limit debtors' ex
post liability avoidance maneuvers, but the limitations are of the
sort that debtors and creditors would generally agree to ex ante.
Also, as discussed below, the doctrinal requirements of these two
areas of law overlap to some degree. Fraudulent transfer law,
however, existed several centuries before general limited liability
corporations came into being.55 If we already have fraudulent
transfer law, what do veil-piercing rules add?
This discussion presents students with yet another layer of
complexity. The discussion further refines their appreciation ofveilpiercing as a sensible addition to the rules governing debtor-creditor
relations.
1. DoctrinalOverlap. Others have noted the doctrinal overlap
between fraudulent transfer law and the rules of veil-piercing." In
particular, insiders' inequitable conduct and inadequate capital or
insolvency are factors in both. Consider a particular case, DeWitt
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W, Ray Flemming Fruit Co.5" Defendant
Flemming was the dominant shareholder-owner of his corporation,
which acted as a commissioned agent for fruit growers. The
corporation sold fruit for growers, remitting sale proceeds to the
growers less amounts for sales commission and transportation
charges. The trouble was, instead of actually paying the transportation charges, the corporation kept the money. Whatever cash was
in the corporation, Flemming would take for his own personal use.
"[I]t would seem that Flemming's withdrawals varied with what
54 Rose-Ackerman, supranote 53, at 950. In addition,
this creditor protection improves
debtors' liquidation values, thereby also increasing their debt capacity. J.B. Heaton, Debt
Capacityand FraudulentConveyance Law, Social Science Research Network Working Paper
Series, Aug. 1998, availableat <http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?ABSTRACTJD=85328>.
" See Halpern et al., supranote 16, at 117 (dating general availability of limited liability
corporations to English Limited Liability Company Act in 1855).
Clark, supra note 4, at 540.
', 540 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1976).
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could be taken out of the corporation at the moment: If this amount
were $15,000, that was Flemming's withdrawal; if it were $25,000,
that was his withdrawal."58 Moreover, these withdrawals-claimed
salary payments-approximated the amounts owing for transportation charges.59 The corporation had virtually no capital and
apparently had never turned a profit.6" It had never held a board
meeting or shareholders' meeting.61 When pressed by the plaintiff
trucking company for payment, Flemming promised to make good
on the obligations personally if the corporation failed to pay.62 On
these facts, the court pierced, finding that the corporation was
merely Flemming's "instrumentality" or "alter ego."63
Would fraudulent transfer law have provided effective relief for
the plaintiff creditor? Could Flemming have been liable for
fraudulent transfer claims in addition to or instead of the veilpiercing claim? Probably so. While the facts of the opinion are not
styled to a fraudulent transfer analysis, we may surmise that many
of the transfers were actually fraudulent. The transfers were to an
insider;64 they may have been concealed; 5 the transfers were made
while the debtor was insolvent;66 and they may have been made
shortly before or after substantial debts were incurred by the
corporation. 7 Constructive fraud claims would likely also have been

" Id. at 688.
59 Id. at 689.
6

Id. at 688.

61 Id.

Id. at 689.
Id. at 688.
[Undercapitalization, coupled with disregard of corporate formali.
ties, lack of participation on the part of other stockholders, and the
failure to pay dividends while paying substantial sums, whether by
way of salary or otherwise, to the dominant stockholder, all fitting
into a picture of basic unfairness, has been regarded fairly uniformly
to constitute a basis for an imposition of individual liability under
the doctrine.
Id. at 687.
" Id. at 688; cf. UFTA § 4(b)(1) (noting insider transfer as factor to consider in
determining actual fraudulent intent).
SCf. UFTA § 4(b)(3) (noting concealed transfer as factor to consider).
6 DeWitt, 540 F.2d at 688; cf UFTA § 4(b)(9) (noting debtor's insolvency as factor to
consider).
7 Cf. UFTA § 4(b)(10) (noting incurring of substantial debt shortly before or after
transfer as factor to consider).
bl

63

2000]

LIMITED LIABILITY

567

available. While Flemming claimed his withdrawals were salary
payments, this assertion lacks credence given his pattern of merely
zeroing out the corporation's available cash. The transfers certainly
left the corporation insolvent, and given that the siphoned amounts
bore no relation to any particular consideration given by Flemming,
a failure of reasonably equivalent value was likely involved.
Quite probably, then, DeWitt could have been brought as a
fraudulent transfer action. The same is likely true for many other
veil-piercing cases.68 Are there differences between these two areas
that explain why both sets of rules exist? The facts of DeWitt may
give us a clue.
2. A Rifle v. A Shotgun. One plausible explanation for veilpiercing is that fraudulent transfer law may not be sufficiently
creditor-protective in a modern economy with corporate actors.
Fraudulent transfer rules evolved at a time when most economic
actors were individuals, and transactions were fairly simple. The
advent of corporations, however, enabled complex paper transactions among corporate insiders and affiliates, thereby multiplying
the ways in which creditor pursuit of debtor assets could be
frustrated.69 Fraudulent transfer law essentially takes a rifle shot
approach. It requires a detailed transfer-by-transfer analysis. Each
specific transfer of assets from the corporation to its insider must be
identified. This may not be easy, especially if-as DeWitt illustrates-the corporation keeps no records and fails at the basic
corporate formalities.7" Then as to each identified transfer, plaintiff
has to show that reasonably equivalent value was not given to the
corporation. In addition, plaintiff must show the requisite corporate
financial distress at the time of each transfer,7 again a perhaps
daunting task for an outsider to a firm with shabby record keeping.

6

See Clark, supra note 4, at 541 (noting that veil-piercing cases invoke fraudulent

conveyance law, but courts ignore relationship).
69 See id. at 543 (The number of unfair transactions with insiders may be large and
indefinite, and proof of unfairness and the extent of lack of fair consideration in each instance
of a transaction may be difficult or extremely costly.").
7' See Franklin A. Gevurtz, PiercingPiercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion
Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercingthe Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 853, 879 (1997)

(explaining scrutiny of corporate formalities in veil-piercing actions as law's suspicion of
hidden or unauthorized transactions with insiders).
1 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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Because these issues are peculiarly within the competence of the
insider, the various showings may be difficult for outside creditors
to make. 72 At the least, investigation costs would be problematic.
By contrast, veil-piercing takes a shotgun approach.73 The
elements are more general and more vague. Particular transactions
need not be identified-let alone dissected-provided that some
misuse of the corporate form is shown. Consider a common
scenario. In the one-person corporation of DeWitt, imagine the
plaintiffs predicament. If the insider is regularly siphoning cash
and running the corporation on zero capital, attacking this siphoning strategy via fraudulent transfer rules would require the outside
creditor to investigate each transfer. Investigation would have to
reveal the corporation's financial condition at the time of each
transfer, and whether or not each salary claim was legitimate and
reasonably equivalent in value to the particular transfer. It is
unlikely that the corporation will keep good records in this classic
one-person corporation scenario, if records exist at all. 7
Veil-piercing, then, responds to proof problems peculiar to the
corporate context that might frustrate a fraudulent transfer
approach. 75 The remedies in the two areas differ as well. Avoidance
of a fraudulent transfer restores the creditor to the position it would
have been in, had the debtor not acted fraudulently. Avoidance
allows the creditor to pursue the asset in the hands of the transferee. The remedy is compensatory and defensive in that it only
reinstates the creditor's pre-transfer position.76
72 The creditor does enjoy a presumption under the modern statute that the debtor is

insolvent if it is generally not paying its debts as they become due. UFTA § 2(b).
73 Clark, supra note 4, at 547.
' With corporation groups, by contrast, the issues are slightly different. While the
record keeping is likely to be adequate, and therefore financial condition will be more easy
to determine, there is still the problem of attacking multiple transfers for inadequate
consideration. Affiliate transactions are so common and may be so pervasive, and there are
so many ways to shift assets among affiliates-management fees, licensing agreements,
leases, etc.-that the plaintiffs proof problems concerning reasonably equivalent value may
be significant.
75 See Clark, supra note 4, at 552 (asserting that veil-piercing functions to "loosen[
] up
the level of proof and the atomistic nature of the analyses required in a fraudulent
conveyance action").
76 On the other hand, this property rule approach is better than a generic contract
remedy, which ordinarily provides only liability rule protection. See supranotes 51-53 and
accompanying text.
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Veil-piercing, on the other hand, provides a fairly aggressive
remedy to the aggrieved creditor. It makes available the entirety of
the shareholder's personal wealth to satisfy the corporation's debt.
This may result in a windfall to the creditor, who may recover more
from the shareholder than it could have recovered from the corporation untainted by the objectionable conduct. The effect is punitive.
Why?
One plausible explanation, consistent with the shotgun approach
of veil-piercing, is that veil-piercing cases may present situations in
which it is difficult to quantify the harm to a creditor from the
insider's inequitable behavior. The imprecision of the approach not
only captures more amorphous forms of undesirable behavior, but
also causes some vagueness in quantifying the remedy. Resolving
this remedial imprecision in favor of the aggrieved creditor seems
reasonable. This approach may provide an important deterrent
effect that helps to minimize the costs of corporate credit. A mere
disgorgement remedy, by contrast, might not dissuade insiders of a
corporation in financial distress.
V. CONCLUSION
Veil-piercing doctrine marks the intersection between corporate
law and debtor-creditor law. It therefore provides an ideal tool for
teaching fundamental economic ideas relating to debtor-creditor
law. I use it for that purpose. I describe economic rationales for
limited liability and its limits. I introduce fraudulent transfer law
and show its parallels with veil-piercing doctrine. Students get a
glimpse at debtor-creditor law, and I get a bit of marketing for my
bankruptcy course.

